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In response to the four commentaries on ‘Cyborg uterine geography’, in which I argued normatively for
reorganizing gestation on the basis of comradeliness, I grapple with three overlapping conceptual areas
highlighted: the ethical and political affordances of the term ‘generosity’ in relation to care and pregnancy;
the methodological question of bringing insights from the uterine field of ‘sympoeisis’ (‘making-with’,
Haraway (2016) Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene. Durham: Duke University Press.) into
the practice of scholarship; and the desire for more place-based specificity in the mapping of uterine
geographies (plural, rather than singular; ‘normal’, as well as ‘queer’). Throughout this reply, I tie my
remarks back to the core framework I advance in my piece, of gestation being work which, as such, has no
predetermined gender, is subject to transformation through struggle, should not be romanticized (for
instance, by identifying it with ‘the biological maternal’). Firstly, I rethink what it means to valorize gesta-
tional relationality in terms of generousness, from an antiwork perspective. Secondly, I engage the question,
‘can uterine geographies also create a methodology of engagement’? while seeking to qualify the proposed
embrace of ‘indeterminacy’. Thirdly, I respond to concerns about the ‘universality’ in my piece by con-
sidering some contemporary examples of uterine politicization, specifically around abortion, that suggest to
me that specificity has served as the matrix through which a ‘militant particularism’ (Harvey and Williams
(1995) Militant particularism and global ambition. Social Text 42(Spring): 69–98.) can emerge in the form of
geographically far-flung Reproductive Justice solidarities.
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Uterine geographers
Robyn Longhurst, Heidi Nast, Kath Browne and
Maria Fannin’s reflections honour me and thicken
geography’s sense of itself as responsible to the
sticky labour of anthrogenesis. To foreground a few
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salient elements of what else was said: Longhurst is
sceptical of my claim that feminist geographers lack
an active verb to describe the work of being preg-
nant and doubts that the verb ‘to gestate’ is it, noting
that the pregnant women she has interviewed did not
talk about ‘gestating’. Browne feels that while I
assert ‘a normal prosthesis-free family does not
exist’, my actual illustrations don’t seem to ‘queer
“normal”’ because they involve (exclusively) ‘trans-
communalities’. Meanwhile, Fannin takes issue with
my strategy of adopting biologist Suzanne Sadedin’s
agonistic, anti-generosity narration of pregnancy as a
way of advancing those aims. Pregnancy, I am
reminded, is ‘hardly presented in modern medical
contexts as an entirely risk-free process’. Far from
iconoclastic, the basic tenets of the ‘war in the womb’
story are actually ‘overfamiliar’ and – Fannin argues
– have to be understood as complicit in ongoing
‘structural violence aimed at [some] birth givers’
in the broader social and political field. In other
words: I should at minimum have prolonged my
attack on the demonization of pregnancy if I was
going to focus so much criticism on its romanticiza-
tion (I address this point in-depth in the next section).
Heidi Nast, for her part, reacts passionately
against my (antiwork) approach of articulating
gestational labour qua work. In the first instance
Nast is, as she indicates, entirely opposed to the
cyborg, Donna Haraway’s dialectic figuration of
colonized embodiment, which Nast (mis)reads
instead as an impossible fusion of opposites. Nast
is clearly unpersuaded by my case for looking at the
cyborgicity of uterine labour relationality (i.e. its
imbricatedness with ecology, animality, racial
techno-capital and imperialism, as well as its imma-
nent potential for anti-colonial postgender proletar-
ian resistance). Indeed, Nast argues that such
relationality doesn’t exist prepartum. For me, this
is not about fetal subjecthood (which I, too, reject)
but about how looking at gestational work – its
distributedness and mixity, its part-conscious and
part-‘autonomic’ character – helps us understand
something about labour more generally. That is,
looking at the sociobiological matrix of the uterine
(not ‘the biological maternal’) helps us dissolve the
putative opposition between production and repro-
duction. In contrast, Nast reaffirms the importance
of this orthodox opposition between female produc-
tive labour and female reproductive labour (‘female
labor . . . [as opposed to] pregnancy’). Like the
romantic (and, I would argue, structurally transpho-
bic) dichotomy of ‘the Machine’ and ‘the maternal’
on which her analysis persistently rests, this
opposition is one I consider to uncritically accept
capitalism’s abstraction of labour to time. Unsur-
prisingly, it eats itself anyway, with Nast ultimately
treating the creativity of pregnancy as a demogra-
pher might: as mechanical productivity.
As we do labour, labour does us back. As Long-
hurst hopefully perceives, the purpose of my use of
abstruse language like ‘metramorphosis’ and ‘sym-
poetic’ is to get at that uncanny dynamic in pregnancy,
which eludes a subject/object division. I am con-
vinced of the insufficiency of the commonplaces at
our disposal – formulations like ‘to be with child’, ‘to
be expecting’ and ‘to have children’, which circle
around the exterior of the gestating body and conceal
its creativity. Even ‘to be pregnant’ only credits the
condition passively to the actor who, having failed to
be ‘impregnable’, was ‘impregnated’. The risk Long-
hurst identifies is that we erect, in language, a sover-
eign subject of gestation that, for some gestators,
simply feels like a lie. Yet some gestators do call what
they are doing gestating and, for me, politically, that’s
enough. Besides, the word ‘gestate’ once denoted
horse-riding! Gest or geste in Old French meant
‘famous deed or exploit’ (as in: chansons de geste).
So, to geste-ate evokes to me a metalevel of action, a
doing of doings or saddling of exploits and exploita-
tions, where the fetus participates in the gesture.
It’s true that, far more than mine, Robyn Long-
hurst’s studies of everyday corporeal boundary trou-
ble do a great job of ‘queering normal’. I did not
look, as I could have done, at the weirdness and
excess of the British Royal Family’s choreography
of its members’ gestational labours (this is the sub-
ject of photographer Natalie Lennard’s series Birth
Undisturbed, 2017). Rather, I looked to the circum-
stances of Maggie Nelson’s pregnancy and to the
domestic mothering practices of Sylvia Rivera and
Marsha Johnson as my key inspirations for ‘Cyborg
uterine geography’. But, thinking back, I didn’t
choose those examples because they were or wer-
en’t ‘normal’. Rather, I chose them because they
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were normatively appealing to me: they were com-
radely. I take Browne’s point, however, and I will
turn presently to a case of a heterosexual marriage in
which the biochemical aggressions of a septic mis-
carriage, combined with the violence of an anti-
feminist juridical system, hold the entrails of a
would-be mother prisoner and fail to let them go.
Fannin asks whether ‘the uterine’ for me is primar-
ily a heuristic metaphor intended to allow social
reproduction theorists to include ‘everything
about “holding and letting go” in a single “uterine”
frame’ – or, alternatively, a material–semiotic assem-
blage whose literal referent is a ‘biology’ that I myself
persuade her isn’t actually known to us ‘ . . . yet!’
Perversely enough, I absolutely loved this deft pro-
blematization, despite not knowing quite how to
answer it ( . . . yet!). I keenly appreciate how it lays
bare a number of the contradictions and latencies
in my articulation of the matter. While I prepare to
re-gestate all this via the intellectual multi-placenta
that is this forum, I can only say, somewhat ruefully,
that Fannin is right: I believe I mean ‘all of the above’.
Agonism in/or generosity?
Fannin’s powerful problematization of my critique
of ‘generosity’ narratives demands far more exten-
sive treatment than what I’ll begin to offer here.
Unlike gestating, the word ‘generous’ historically
denoted a passive ontological state, namely, the con-
dition of being ‘of noble birth’ (from the Latin
genus, as in genesis and pro-genitor). Generosity
was essentially noblesse oblige. That is, the word’s
senses of unselfishness and bounty – effectively
their only senses today – originally stemmed from
these virtues’ close association with elite ‘race or
stock’. In reality, of course, it is reliably the precar-
ious lower classes in society who turn out to practice
the most charity. But the concept of generosity, in its
very construction, still reflects the injustices of a
class society that disproportionately recognizes the
beneficence of the moneyed, high-born, celebrated
and pedigreed. As Fannin’s questions remind me,
Rosalyn Diprose knows this all too well. In Corporeal
Generosity, Diprose illustrates the paradox whereby,
in order to demonstrate generosity (as opposed to
selflessness) one has to be recognized as individually
self-possessed and sovereign; yet to even be recog-
nized as such in the first place, a feminine subject has
to first demonstrate generosity. Received models of
generosity are raced and gendered, such that some of
us ‘seem to be incapable of giving anything except that
which already belongs to someone else or that which
must be extracted by force’ (2002: 56).
While unsparingly demolishing both the contrac-
tual and the moral–volitional models of generosity,
Diprose still insists on a third, liberatory version. An
emancipatory generosity, she avers, ‘is not the
expenditure of one’s possession but the disposses-
sion of oneself, the being-given to others that under-
cuts any self-contained ego’ (2002: 4). It is
essentially this radical generosity that Myra Hird
takes up, too, in her theorization of the corporeality
of pregnancy in terms of ‘impetuousness, reckless-
ness’ (2007: 5), ‘excess, unknowability and open-
ness’ (9). It signifies a constitutive openness to the
other that doesn’t have to be accepted, received or
even recognized in order to matter (in fact, it often
goes ‘unanticipated and unrecognized’; Hird, 2007:
6). It brings to mind Maggie Nelson’s willingness ‘to
go to pieces’ (2015: 134). Hird visits touchstone texts
of feminism that revile the parasitism of the fetus; but
clearly maintains, with Diprose, that even the uncon-
scious and unwilling dynamics of gestating can be
usefully framed in terms of gifting and generosity.
Fannin asks that I consider the possibility that the
rhetoric of maternal generosity ‘counter[s] the char-
acterisation of gestation as a naturally unfolding
process of competition and antagonism that under-
writes all human beginnings’. My doubts persist, as
follows: Can a coerced, parasited generosity mili-
tate against those damaging naturalizing character-
izations of labour? Can a victim, a technology, be
meaningfully generous? Can workers be truly hos-
pitable, under capitalism? Fannin mentions the
‘caveat’ that acts of generosity or hospitality are not
always welcomed or possible. This, for me, is abso-
lutely key. I submit that adopting an alternative
topos – such as comradeliness – might enable us
to better frame the politics of the strange combina-
tion of activeness, passivity, automation, intention,
refusal, extraction, parasitism, care and violence at
the placental interface. When I gestate, the question
for me is how to be a comradely cohabitant and
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adversary and nurse and environment and even
competitor to my fetus(es), all at once.
The putative novelty of modern ‘infertility solu-
tions’ inheres precisely in their partial evacuation of
the whole question of generosity, of motherliness,
from the labour of gestating. It is tempting, as a
feminist academic, to seek to simply reverse this
denial of generosity in the name of valorizing and
making it visible, by analogy with motherhood. But
is generosity, or exploitation, the truer representa-
tion of gestational service’s horizons? It is worth
recalling that Angela Davis didn’t think the so-
called New Reproductive Technologies were all that
‘new’: Hadn’t Black women long served as surro-
gates on the American plantation (Davis, 1998)? Put
another way: an enslaved person cannot be mean-
ingfully generous; it is politically irresponsible to
valorize her generosity. But comradeliness is differ-
ent. While motherhood in the United States was
elaborated as an institution of married White
womanhood, Black slaves could make no claim of
kinship or property to the fruits of their gestational
labours. They could, however, be comradely to
those infants. To this day, these fundamental racial
and class dynamics continue to trouble the common-
place certainty (mater semper certa est) that gesta-
tion ‘naturally’ produces the status of motherhood
for the gestator in the United States.
This raises the question of whether it should:
Whether motherhood and pregnancy per se are viable
cornerstones – as Nast assumes they are – of a live-
able world. Orna Donath highlights that there is an
epidemic of ‘regretting motherhood’ in the Western
world (Donath, 2017). Erica Millar documents how
abortions are overwhelmingly happy experiences
(Millar, 2017). Yet hegemonic culture remains as
natalist and repro-normative as ever, and the inferti-
lity industry, throwing every last resource at the
achievement of individual pregnancies, shores up the
desire for a biogenetic babe-of-one’s-own under
the guise of catering to it. On the other hand, radicals
such as Alexis Pauline Gumbs are reviving traditions
of ‘polymaternalism’ (where each child has many
mothers, of whatever gender) as evidence of the
‘queerness’ and communistic anti-propertarianism
of some long-standing Black kinship practices
(Gumbs et al., 2016; Lewis, 2018). Doing away with
parental possessiveness, fostering a comradely rela-
tion between adults and children instead: This was
the arc of 1970s gay liberation’s politics of family
abolition. It’s the key point of much of the specula-
tive science fiction Nast notices me ‘skipping over’ in
this particular piece: For instance, Marge Piercy’s
vision of a society that has automated gestation and
communized child-rearing (‘kid-binding’) in Woman
on the Edge of Time (Piercy, 1983). And it was, of
course, the oft-forgotten crux of Shulamith Fire-
stone’s idiosyncratic proposals in The Dialectic of
Sex (Firestone, 2015). It is clear from Donath’s
accounts that one can be comradely in a situation
characterized, among other things, by regret and
antagonism – most mothers manage to be so at least
some of the time – even as your fetus ‘runs you over
like a truck’ (Nelson, 2015: 134). As the Sisterhood
of Black Single Mothers proclaimed, children ‘will
not belong to the patriarchy. They will not belong to
us either. They will belong only to themselves’.
Sympoetic methods
Children are at stake to all of us because we all shape
and make them (even while they, as well as everyone
else, are doing the same for, to and through us). The
term sympoeisis (making-with) is an attempt to sum-
marize this core characteristic of social reproduction,
understood as a matrix of co-creative and co-
destructive labour. Writing is sympoetic: While the
name on the byline of the article is mine, the various
mutually incompatible thoughts that gestated its con-
tents, like the labours that gestated (all the way into
adulthood) the thinkers of those ongoing thoughts, are
many. Mario Biagioli puts it well in his essay compar-
ing gestational surrogacy with intellectual plagiarism:
‘authorship can only be coauthorship’ (2014: 84).
Sympoiesis can be a curse as well as a blessing. While
the Sisterhood of Black Single Mothers espoused a
commoning, communizing politics in relation to chil-
dren, it is perfectly possible to remove those determi-
nations from the idea of sympoeisis, anchoring it
instead to fascist values or to the thoroughgoing ‘inde-
terminacy’ to which Kath Browne is committed.
I have struggled to understand what differentiates
Browne’s caution that ‘it is in the collective, and
particularly societal responsibility for uterine values,
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that unwelcome interventions and restrictions can
lie’ from a rejection of the problem of politics per
se – the problem of living with and through others.
Asks Browne: ‘Can uterine geographies also create a
methodology of engagement based in indetermi-
nacy?’ When I said that the relationship between fem-
inist struggle and the uterus ‘should be treated as open
to determination’ I also meant that it should be (re)de-
termined. My noting that, in Myra Hird’s pro-
generosity approach, ‘the relational result of gestation
is normatively determinate’, was not a critique of her
normativity per se but of its not going far enough: Hird
presumes that production by gestation of a mother–
baby bond is a good thing, just by itself. I wanted to
pose the question of which bonds? (as well as answer-
ing it: comradely ones, not necessarily involving the
gestator in any particularly privileged way).
Robyn Longhurst writes that she is ‘not entirely
sure how focusing on the uterus might help to ensure
that more non-normative accounts of care and social
reproduction emerge’. Again, I do not seek to foster
merely ‘non-normative’ accounts in my community.
My account is intensely normative. This divergence
explains why Longhurst brings up the abusive and
filthy-rich Londoner Edina (from Ab Fab) in the con-
text of my call to ‘deromanticize’. Longhurst puts the
‘bad’ in ‘bad mothers’ in scare quotes and suggests
that such figures, or their representation in popular
culture, ‘may have something to offer’. While I laugh
heartily at (and with) Edina, the point I was attempt-
ing to make was that bad mothers – abusive, exploi-
tative, policing, bourgeois, phobic, violent mothers,
sans scare quotes – are a real political problem. It is
understandable that leftists and feminists should
focus all their energies on defending mothers (espe-
cially single, teen, working-class, migrant, addicted,
incarcerated, welfare-recipient mothers) from the
charge of ‘bad mother’. I don’t for one second sug-
gest that the effort to combat their institutional ill-
treatment and humiliation should stop; rather, I insist
we can oppose capitalist anti-mother policy without
falling into pro-motherhood. Focusing on the uterus
in such a way as to centre the goal of family abolition
(which includes motherhood abolition) – and what
Treva Ellison calls ‘trans reproductive labour’
(Ellison, 2017) – is a strategy intended to immanently
carry forward the sense in which pregnancy will be,
albeit bloody, also latently anti-capitalist.
I can see Browne is being fair when she points
out ‘it is a stretch’ for me to have suggested radical
geographers ‘collude’ in mistaking pregnancy for
what Maggie Nelson calls ‘the ultimate conformity’
or that they’ve not been interested in mapping the
uterine. I wonder if I myself mistook pregnancy for
the ultimate conformity for some time – and pro-
jected my shortcomings onto a discipline that is in
fact full of unruly corporeographies! While I dis-
agree (as will be clear from the above discussion)
with Browne’s implication that thinking with the
uterus could easily be made to ‘rework our [scho-
larly] engagements with each other’ in such a way
that academia would become more generous rather
than less, the point is well-taken that a call to com-
mit to a comradely ‘holding and letting go’ should
practice what it preaches. Browne reminds me that
‘these authors, academics and people have laid the
groundwork’. I agree; and to the extent that my
critique became ‘chastisement’ I fell short of the
norms of sympoetic scholarship to which I aspire.
Militant particulars
Robyn Longhurst indicates that she would like to
see more attention to ‘the specificity of the way
wombs are lived in particular contexts’. The wish
for a ‘militant particularism’ (Harvey and Williams,
1995) – albeit difficult – is undoubtedly the right
line of inquiry. Clearly, geographies dictate impor-
tant things like whether gestation can be opted out of
(e.g. the local culture around abortion, the quality
and accessibility of healthcare provisioning, and
law), even if these contexts do not predict the phe-
nomenological experience of pregnancy in a consis-
tent way. Some gestators feel, like Sylvia Plath, that
‘a black force [is] blotting out my brain and utterly
possessing me’ (Plath, 2001); while others breezily
refer to themselves as ‘an Easy-Bake oven’ (Kuc-
zynski, 2008). The difficulty stems from a near-
unique peculiarity of gestational labour, which is
that both upper-class and lower-class, Black and
non-Black, settler and indigenous, propertied and
homeless people do it (and feel wildly idiosyncratic
things about it). I’ve read many ethnographies of
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commercial gestational workplaces – in various
locales in Mexico and India – and even there, within
one dormitory, the diversity and specificity of gesta-
tional experience proves really difficult to condense
(Deomampo, 2016; Schurr and Militz, 2018). I’d
still defend the value of a singular (normative) polit-
ical intervention, but wholeheartedly support the
commitment called for, to ‘teasing out the universal
and particularities of these cyborg uterine geogra-
phies (plural rather than singular)’.
I will speak to two particularities of the cyborg
uterine political landscape. Some readers of Dialo-
gues in Human Geography surely felt the same shi-
vers up their spine I felt, watching footage of crowds
in Dublin chanting ‘Savita, Savita’ in the aftermath
of the referendum on abortion held in Ireland on 27
May, 2018. The case has served – continues to serve
– both as a tragic memorial and as the luminous
catalyst for freer uterine geographies worldwide.
Savita Halappanavar, a 31-year-old dentist, was
directly killed by the Irish medico-legal establish-
ment in 2012 as a result of being denied life-saving
healthcare in the 17th week of her gestation. Her
dead, though only partially miscarried fetus, which
had gone septic, was legally entitled to better treat-
ment in medical terms than was Dr Halappanavar
herself – that is, it could not be removed from her –
until it was too late. The vividness with which the
murder rammed home the sadism of a situation of
forced gestation was undoubtedly one of the factors
that inspired the overwhelmingly trans-inclusive and
working-class-led Irish feminist movement to push
so tirelessly for the last 5 years, ensuring abortion was
at long last decriminalized. From my perspective,
too, the consequences of rebuffing Savita’s request
for an abortion highlight my article’s contentions
that: all reproduction is assisted; ‘labour does you’;
and the freedom to stop working whenever we wish is
vital – even when it comes to the work of making
babies who will die when we stop. Across the board,
workers deserve to be rescued from their work
when – as it was for Halappanavar, whose body was
undertaking the process of miscarriage with lethal
slowness – it is going gruesomely awry.
Since moving to the United States, where rates of
death caused by gestation are about the worst in the
‘developed’ world, I’ve been acutely aware of living
in a gestational dystopia far more banal than any-
thing envisioned in the bioconservative dystopia
The Handmaid’s Tale or its television adaptation.
One-hundred fifty years since chattel slavery was
formally ended in the United States, Black gestators
are still three to four times more likely than White
ones to die from pregnancy. This social environ-
ment – what I think we should be calling the strati-
fied infrastructure of forced gestation – sustains
itself not only thanks to racism and classism but also
thanks to medical rules near-identical to those that
killed Savita Halappanavar. These rules restrict
what doctors in many parts of the United States can
do to the ‘motherfetus’ organism (I take this phrase
from Chikako Takeshita, 2017), dictating on pain of
disbarment what must be said and done to pregnant
patients, via guidelines that essentially suspend
pregnant people’s personhood. The priority of the
so-called ‘fetal personhood’ is an obsession that
even extends to the so-called ‘preemies’: fetuses
who have exited the womb prematurely. It was in
Philadelphia, my adoptive city, that lambs were
gestated to term in ectogenetic ‘bio-bags’ last year
in one of many experiments geared towards saving
human ‘preemies’ (and certainly not towards the end
of liberating human adults from the need to do gesta-
tional work). The very suggestion that a preference
among adults – simply, to have kids but not ever get
pregnant – might be sufficient justification for
researching such technology is downright reviled.
Female commissioning parents who hire surrogates
without being ‘infertile’ are derided with astonishing
virulence for their ‘vanity’. Yet, as Arwa Mahdawi
crisply attests, ‘there doesn’t seem to be such a
stigma in [cis] men saying that there is no way they’d
ever want to be pregnant’ (Mahdawi, 2018).
There is cause for hope, though, since inspiration
has flowed abundantly across the ocean after the
overwhelming vote to repeal the 8th Amendment.
In North America, the Reproductive Justice move-
ment is gaining momentum, with radical ‘full-spec-
trum’ doulas (who assist not only birthing but dying,
miscarriage and abortion) accelerating the charge to
defend Medicare from Trumpian attacks (SisterSong,
2018). Left feminists in my state are organizing to
expose and drive out the plague of ‘Crisis Pregnancy
Centers’: anti-abortion missions dressed up to look
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medical. Increasingly, these efforts are framed in
trans-inclusive language, conceptualized by and in
solidarity with transgender people. On this point,
much of academia does (genuinely!) lag behind.
‘While acknowledgement that not all women are
mothers is fairly commonplace, the fact that not all
pregnant or potentially pregnant persons are mothers
or women has yet to transform our language and con-
ceptual frames substantively’ (Takeshita, 2017). If it
is ‘chastising’ to say that heel-dragging on the part of
‘sceptics’ in my camp is doing us all harm, so be it. In
her otherwise excellent Happy Abortions, Erica
Millar asks doubtfully whether it is ‘possible or desir-
able’ to envisage a gender-neutral subject of preg-
nancy (Millar, 2017: 4). History is already
overtaking her, with major medical institutions
tweaking their obstetric policies (British Medical
Association, 2017). Happy Abortions powerfully
transforms our conceptual frames, showing that preg-
nant people ‘are not automatically mothers’. Couldn’t
it therefore also help us see they aren’t automatically
women, either? To do so would not rob feminist strug-
gle of its constituency; quite the contrary. It would
enable us to better notice how all of those roles
(mothering, being a woman, gestating) involve par-
tially unconscious, not readily interruptible work
which can –with a little help from one’s comrades –
be refused and/or redistributed.
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